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Abstract: 
 
We introduce axiomatically a new solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility inspired by 
the core. While core solution concepts have investigated the sustainability of cooperation among players, our 
solution concept, called contraction core, focuses on the deterrence of cooperation. The main interest of the 
contraction core is to provide a monetary measure of the robustness of cooperation into the grand coalition. 
We motivate this concept by providing optimal fine imposed by competition authorities for the dismantling of 
cartels in oligopolistic markets. We characterize the contraction core on the set of balanced cooperative 
games with transferable utility by four axioms: the two classic axioms of non-emptiness and individual 
rationality, a superadditivity principle and a new axiom of consistency. 
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Abstrat
We introdue axiomatially a new solution onept for ooperative games with transferable
utility inspired by the ore. While ore solution onepts have investigated the sustainability
of ooperation among players, our solution onept, alled ontration ore, fouses on the
deterrene of ooperation. The main interest of the ontration ore is to provide a monetary
measure of the robustness of ooperation into the grand oalition. We motivate this onept
by providing optimal ne imposed by ompetition authorities for the dismantling of artels in
oligopolisti markets. We haraterize the ontration ore on the set of balaned ooperative
games with transferable utility by four axioms: the two lassi axioms of non-emptiness and
individual rationality, a superadditivity priniple and a new axiom of onsisteny.
Keywords: TU-game, ontration ore, optimal ne, Cournot oligopoly, axiomatization
JEL Classiation: C71, D43
1 Introdution
One of the main issues in ooperative game theory onerns the possibility for players to oop-
erate all together. A well-known solution onept for ooperative games with transferable utility
(heneforth TU-games) dealing with the existene of stable ooperative agreements is the ore
(Gillies, 1953). The lassi Bondareva-Shapley theorem establishes that the non-emptiness of the
ore is haraterized by the balanedness property as proved independently in Bondareva (1963)
and Shapley (1967). A possible interpretation of the balanedness property whih we are interest
in is the following: eah player must distribute one unit of time among all the oalitions of whih
she is a member; the balanedness property stipulates that the optimal time alloation for players
is to devote all their unit of time into the grand oalition, i.e., the whole set of players.
Even in the ase where the ore is empty, the literature has investigated the possibility to en-
fore a stable ooperative agreement by introduing other ore solution onepts: the strong and
the weak ǫ-ores (Shapley and Shubik, 1966), the least ore (Mashler et al., 1979), the aspiration
∗
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ore (Albers, 1979; Cross, 1967; Bennett, 1983), the extended ore (Bejan and Gómez, 2009),
the negoiation set (Gonzalez and Grabish, 2015b) and the d-multioalitional ore (Gonzalez and
Grabish, 2016). All these ore extensions are non-empty when applied to non-balaned TU-games
and oinide with the ore on the set of balaned TU-games.
Until now, solution onepts inspired by the ore have restrited attention to the sustainability
of ooperation. Nevertheless, in many ompetitive environments, ooperation is not soially desir-
able, and players must be disouraged to work all together. For example, horizontal agreements on
pries between rms are punished by ompetition authorities. Similarly, drug artels are reproved
to protet population. In the same vein, the dismantling of terrorist groups appears to be of
primary importane for national seurity. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, even when
ooperation is eient, the robustness of stable ooperative agreements has not been studied
yet. For example, how muh the ohesion of ollaborative ativities on researh and development
is sensible to disovery values? Or does the stability of trade agreements depend ruially on
transportation osts? To meet these hallenges head on, a general solution onept spanning sev-
eral elds of eonomis (industrial organization, innovation, international trade, riminology. . . )
appears fundamental in order to provide insight into the deterrene of ooperation.
In this artile, we investigate the deterrene of ooperation among players for balaned ooper-
ative TU-games by imposing monetary penalty on the grand oalition. Preisely, we are interested
in nding the minimal amount of ne, alled the optimal ne, under whih ooperation an no
longer be sustained. This leads us to onsider a new solution onept, alled ontration ore,
whih ontains all stable ooperative agreements for whih any ne inrease makes these agree-
ments unstable. In this sense, the ontration ore ontains all the weakest stable ooperative
agreements further to the optimal ne imposed on the grand oalition. This ne an be inter-
preted as a measure of the robustness of ooperation into the grand oalition. In terms of time
alloation, this means that authority deters the formation of the grand oalition and that players
must devote frations of their unit of time to any other oalition as a seond best time alloation.
This notion will be used for the denition of feasibility and eieny onditions related to our
solution onept. Unlike the ore solution onepts mentioned above, the ontration ore does
not ontain the ore, and so it is not a ore extension. Moreover, the ontration ore has the
advantage of being a singleton on the set of balaned and symmetri TU-games.
Following in the footsteps of previous works (Trokel, 2005; Moulin, 2014) whih deal with miroe-
onomis by using ooperative onepts, we propose an illustrative example of oligopolisti markets
in order to motivate our solution onept. In eonomi welfare analysis, it is a well-established
and old idea that monopoly power often negatively aets soial welfare. Although oopera-
tion on researh and development ativities may have beneial welfare eets (D'Aspremont and
Jaquemin, 1988), most of horizontal agreements on sales pries are onsidered as harmful to so-
ial welfare. The ooperative approah of oligopoly games is of great interest in order to analyze
the stability of artels whih are one of the main preoupations of ompetition authorities.
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We
point out that our analysis does not pay attention to the welfare eets of trade restrition as ad-
voated by the rule of reason in antitrust law, but fouses on the deterrene of the monopoly power
whih leads, a priori, to welfare losses. Thus, the ontration ore onstitutes an eetive tool to
1
The developing theory of oligopoly TU-games omprises many ontributions suh as Zhao (1999), Norde et al.
(2002), Driessen and Meinhardt (2005), Lardon (2012) and Lekeas and Stamatopoulos (2014) among others.
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prevent the formation of artel. Preisely, we onsider the set of Cournot oligopoly TU-games in
γ-harateristi funtion form (Hart and Kurz, 1983) whih is plausible in the ontext of oligopoly
industries. Under this approah, the worth of any oalition (the artel prot) is enfored by a
ompetition setting in whih any artel faes external rms ating individually. We assume that
the inverse demand funtion is linear and rms operate at onstant and idential marginal osts.
These assumptions ensure that the balanedness property holds on this set of Cournot oligopoly
TU-games as shown by Lardon (2012), and so the ontration ore is well-dened. After having
determined the worth of any oalition, we ompute the ontration ore and provide an expression
of the optimal ne imposed by ompetition authorities in order to deter the grand oalition whih
orresponds, in the present ase, to the artel omprising all the rms. Surprisingly, this expression
diers depending on the number of rms and leads to distinguish markets of small size (less than
ve rms) and those of medium and large size (more than six rms).
Beyond this eonomi appliation, in order to get a better grasp of the ontration ore, we provide
an axiomati haraterization of this new solution onept on the set of balaned TU-games. We
invoke the two lassi axioms of non-emptiness and individual rationality as well as two new other
axioms of superadditivity and onsisteny. The original superadditivity and onsisteny properties
(Peleg, 1986) used to haraterize the ore, impliitly depend on grand oalition feasibility. We
replae them with similar properties based on a new denition of feasibility derived from non-
trivial oalition formation whih relies on seond best time alloation for players.
2
We impose this
feasibility requirement on our superadditivity priniple. Consisteny priniple is based on an appro-
priated redued games property. Traditional redued games (Davis and Mashler, 1965) used by
Peleg (1986) make an exeption to the grand oalition in order to ensure grand oalition feasibility.
Bejan and Gómez (2012) use a more general version (Moldovanu and Winter, 1994) that treats
all oalitions in the same way. Our new axiom of onsisteny is based on a new modied version
of redued games whih make again an exeption to the grand oalition. Preisely, unlike any
other oalition, the grand oalition of any redued game is not allowed to ooperate with the om-
plementary oalition. Moreover, given any seond best time alloation in the original TU-game,
we provide a formula to ompute the orresponding seond best time alloation in any redued
game. Our axioms of superadditivity and onsisteny do not oinide with those of Peleg (1986)
and their generalized versions in Bejan and Gómez (2012) on the set of balaned TU-games.
The artile is organized as follows. Setion 2 presents the ontration ore as well as some of its
properties. Setion 3 gives an illustrative example of oligopolisti markets for the deterrene of
the monopoly power. In Setion 4, we provide an axiomati haraterization of the ontration
ore. Setion 5 deals with a natural extension of the ontration ore to the set of all TU-games.
2 Cooperatives games and the ontration ore
2.1 Cooperatives games with transferable utility
A ooperative TU-game is an ordered pair (N, v) onsisting of a nite set of players N and a
harateristi funtion v : 2N −→ R suh that v(∅) = 0 where 2N denotes the power set of
N . Subsets of N are alled oalitions, and we all v(S) the worth of oalition S. The size of
2
Bejan and Gómez (2012) use a more relaxed feasibility ondition based on rst best time alloation.
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oalition S is denoted by s = |S|. Let Γ denote the set of TU-games.
Later in the paper, we will use both simple and symmetri TU-games. A TU-game (N, v) is
simple if for any oalition S ∈ 2N\{∅, N}, we have v(S) ∈ {0, 1} and v(N) = 1. A oalition
S suh that v(S) = 1 is alled a winning oalition. A player i ∈ N is alled a veto player if
she belongs to any winning oalition. A TU-game (N, v) is symmetri if there exists a mapping
f : N −→ R suh that for any oalition S ∈ 2N\{∅}, we have v(S) = f(s).
Let B ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a olletion of oalitions. Then B is said to be a balaned olletion of
oalitions if for every S ∈ B there exists a balaning weight δS ∈ R+ suh that
∑
S∈B:i∈S δS = 1
for every i ∈ N . Consider δS as an amount of time alloated to oalition S by any of its members.
When eah player has one unit of time, the requirement that
∑
S∈B:i∈S δS = 1 is then a time
feasibility ondition. We denote by Λ(N) the set of balaned olletions and Λ∗(N) the set
of balaned olletions not ontaining the grand oalition where n ≥ 2. By onvention,
Λ∗(N) = Λ(N) when n = 1. A TU-game (N, v) is balaned if for every balaned olletion
B ∈ Λ(N) it holds that
∑
S∈B δSv(S) ≤ v(N). Let Γc denote the subset of balaned TU-
games. On the set Γc the best time alloation for players is to devote all their unit of time to the
grand oalition.
2.2 Feasibility as seond best time alloation
We now introdue the appropriate notion of feasibility whih will be useful for the denition of the
ontration ore. In a TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ, every player i ∈ N may reeive a payo xi ∈ R. A
vetor x ∈ Rn is a payo vetor. For any oalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} and any payo vetor x ∈ Rn,
we dene x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi and we denote by x
S ∈ Rs the vetor suh that xSi = xi for all i ∈ S.
Generally speaking, feasibility is a restrition on players' payos and an be interpreted in terms
of time alloation. The lassi feasibility ondition, alled the grand oalition feasibility, is dened
as the set of payo vetors, denoted by X(N, v), that are feasible when players alloate their unit
of time to the grand oalition, i.e.:
X(N, v) = {x ∈ Rn : x(N) ≤ v(N)}.
A more relaxed feasibility ondition whih onsiders non-trivial oalition formation, is dened as
the set of payo vetors, denoted by XΛ(N, v), that are feasible when players an devote frations
of their time to any oalition, not just the grand oalition, i.e.:
XΛ(N, v) = {x ∈ R
n : x(N) ≤
∑
S∈B
δSv(S) for some B ∈ Λ(N)}.
On the set Γc, both onditions of feasibility are equivalent sine the best time alloation for
players is to form the grand oalition. Now, suppose authority prevents the formation of the grand
oalition. The feasibility ondition whih we are interested in beomes some possible arrangements
of players devoting frations of their time to any oalition exept the grand oalition.
Denition 2.1 For any TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc, the set of feasible payo vetors of (N, v),
denoted by XΛ∗(N, v), is dened as:
4
XΛ∗(N, v) = {x ∈ R
n : x(N) ≤
∑
S∈B
δSv(S) for some B ∈ Λ
∗(N)},
On the set Γc, this feasibility ondition relies on oalition formation of players as seond best time
alloation. This leads to dene the assoiated eieny ondition.
Denition 2.2 For any TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc, the set of eient payo vetors of (N, v),
denoted by X∗Λ∗(N, v), is dened as:
X∗Λ∗(N, v) = argmax{x(N) : x ∈ XΛ∗(N, v)}.
On the set Γc, any eient payo vetor is exatly ahieved by a seond best time alloation for
players.
2.3 Contration ore
The new feasibility and eient onditions related to seond best time alloation permit to dene
the main objet of our study on the set Γc, the ontration ore.
Denition 2.3 For any TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc, the ontration ore, denoted by CC(N, v), is
dened as:
CC(N, v) = {x ∈ X∗Λ∗(N, v) : ∀S ⊂ N , x(S) ≥ v(S)}.
The ontration ore ontains all eient payo vetors
3
ahieved by any seond best time al-
loation that satisfy a relaxed oalitional stability ondition for whih the grand oalition is not
taken into aount.
The following are the denitions of the ore and the aspiration ore for whih we will make
omparisons with the ontration ore.
4
The ore (Gillies, 1953) of a TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ,
denoted by C(N, v), is dened as:
C(N, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) : ∀S ⊆ N , x(S) ≥ v(S)}.
Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) showed that any TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc if and only if
C(N, v) 6= ∅. The aspiration ore (Albers, 1979; Cross, 1967; Bennett, 1983) of a TU-game
(N, v) ∈ Γ, denoted by AC(N, v), is dened as:
AC(N, v) = {x ∈ XΛ(N, v) : ∀S ⊆ N , x(S) ≥ v(S)}.
Both the ore and the aspiration ore ontain all feasible payo vetors (with the understanding
that we onsider grand oalition feasibility for the former and feasibility as rst best time alloation
for the latter) that satisfy the lassi oalitional stability ondition.
3
We need to use the set of eient payo vetors in the denition of the ontration ore in order to deal with
the one-player ase.
4
While the ontration ore is dened on the subset Γc, the ore and the aspiration ore are dened on the set
Γ.
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2.4 Deterrene of ooperation
We now show that the ontration ore is relevant in order to deal with the deterrene of oop-
eration. Given any TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc and any t ∈ R+, its t-ontration is the TU-game,
denoted by (N, vt), suh that vt(S) = v(S) for any S ⊂ N , and vt(N) = v(N)− t. In partiular,
we assign real number t(N, v), alled the optimal ne, to any TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc, whih is
dened as:
t(N, v) =
{
inf{t ∈ R : ∀k > t, (N, vk) is not balaned} if n ≥ 2;
0 if n = 1.
The t(N, v)-ontration orresponds to the original TU-game (N, v) for whih the grand oalition
must pay optimal ne t(N, v). This optimal ne gives the minimal amount for whih any ne
inrease makes ooperation into the grand oalition unstable. It an be onsidered as a measure
of the robustness of stable ooperative agreements.
5
An alternative formula of the optimal ne
easier to ompute is the following:
t(N, v) = v(N)− max
B∈Λ∗(N)
∑
S∈B
δSv(S).
We show that the ontration ore of any TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc is equal to the ore of its
t(N, v)-ontration.
Proposition 2.4 For any TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc, it holds that CC(N, v) = C(N, v
t(N,v)).
Proof: First, we prove that C(N, vt(N,v)) ⊆ CC(N, v). Take any x ∈ C(N, vt(N,v)). Then, it
holds that:
x(N) = vt(N,v)(N)
= v(N)− t(N, v)
= max
B∈Λ∗(N)
∑
S∈B
δSv(S).
Hene x ∈ X∗Λ∗(N, v). Moreover, for any S ∈ 2
N\{∅, N} we have:
x(S) ≥ vt(N,v)(S)
= v(S),
whih proves that x ∈ CC(N, v).
Seond, we prove that CC(N, v) ⊆ C(N, vt(N,v)). Take any x ∈ CC(N, v). Sine x ∈
X∗Λ∗(N, v) the above equalities imply that x(N) = v
t(N,v)(N). Moreover, it holds that for
any S ∈ 2N\{∅, N}, x(S) ≥ v(S) = vt(N,v)(S). Hene x ∈ C(N, vt(N,v)). 
5
Observe that t(N, v) = 0 for the one-player ase sine no ooperation ours.
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The ontration ore ontains all the weakest stable ooperative agreements further to the
optimal ne imposed on the grand oalition. This means that authority deters the formation
of the grand oalition whih ompels players to nd another almost unstable agreement in the
ontration ore.
2.5 Properties of the ontration ore
One of the main advantages of the ontration ore is to be a singleton on the set of balaned and
symmetri TU-games. In order to prove this result, we rst introdue the onept of autonomous
oalition (Gonzalez and Grabish, 2015a). Given any TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc, a oalition S ∈
2N\{∅} is autonomous for (N, v) if for any payo vetor x ∈ C(N, v), it holds that x(S) = v(S).
Proposition 2.5 (Gonzalez and Grabish, 2015a) For any TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc, the following
statements are equivalent:
1. There exists a oalition S ∈ 2N\{∅, N} whih is autonomous for (N, v).
2. For all t > 0, it holds that C(N, vt) = ∅.
Furthermore, Gonzalez and Grabish (2015a) prove that the set of autonomous oalitions is a
balaned olletion.
Proposition 2.6 For any symmetri TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc, the ontration ore CC(N, v) is a
singleton.
Proof: It follows from the symmetry of (N, v) that its t(N, v)-ontration (N, vt(N,v)) is also
symmetri. By Proposition 2.4, it holds that CC(N, v) = C(N, vt(N,v)). It is well-known that
payo vetor x ∈ Rn suh that xi = v
t(N,v)(N)/n for all i ∈ N is a ore element of any symmetri
and balaned TU-game. Moreover, it follows from Proposition 2.5 that there exists an autonomous
oalition K ⊂ N of size k < n. The symmetry of (N, v) implies that any oalition S of size k is
also autonomous. The olletion of all oalitions of size k, denoted by B, is a balaned olletion
with weight δS =
(
n−1
k−1
)
for any S ∈ B. We dene payo vetor x′ ∈ Rn suh that x′i = v(K)/k
for all i ∈ N . Hene, it holds that:
x′(N) =
∑
S∈B
(
n−1
k−1
)
x′(S)
=
∑
S∈B
(
n−1
k−1
)
v(S)
= vt(N,v)(N),
where the last equality follows from Proposition 2.5. We onlude that xi = x
′
i for all i ∈ N , and
so x′ ∈ CC(N, v).
It remains to show that x′ ∈ CC(N, v) is the unique element of the ontration ore. Suppose
by ontradition that there exists y ∈ CC(N, v) suh that y 6= x′. Then, there exists a player
j ∈ N suh that yj > v(K)/k and a player i ∈ N suh that yi < v(K)/k. Sine k < n,
there exists an autonomous oalition T of size k suh that j ∈ T and i 6∈ T . Hene, it holds
that
∑
r∈T\{j} yr < (v(K)/k)× (k− 1), and so
∑
r∈(T∪{i})\{j} yr < v(K), a ontradition sine
(T ∪ {i})\{j} is also an autonomous oalition. 
Next, we provide a subset of simple TU-games in whih the ontration ore is not a singleton.
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Proposition 2.7 For any simple TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ with at least two veto players and at least
two winning oalitions, the ontration ore is not a singleton.
Proof: It is known that the ore of any simple TU-game ontains any payo vetor that distributes
all the gains of the grand oalition among veto players. Take any simple TU-game (N, v) with at
least two veto players and at least two winning oalitions. It holds that v(N) = 1 and v(S) = 1
for some S ∈ 2N\{∅, N} whih implies that CC(N, v) = C(N, v). Moreover, sine there are
at least two veto players, the above-mentioned result on the ore permits to onlude that the
ontration ore is not a singleton. 
The following example shows that the ontration ore may not be a singleton even on the set of
all TU-games.
Example 2.8 Consider the TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc suh that N = {1, 2, 3}, v({1}) = v({2}) = 0,
v({3}) = 3, v({1, 2}) = 6, v({1, 3}) = v({2, 3}) = 0, and v({1, 2, 3}) = 15. Then, it holds that
t(N, v) = 6 and CC(N, v) = onvex hull{(6, 0, 3); (0, 6, 3)}.
3 Illustrative example
In this setion, we propose to apply the ontration ore to oligopolisti markets in order to
ompute the optimal ne imposed by ompetition authorities for artel deterrene. We analyze
a quantity ompetition between n rms. Every rm i ∈ N produes quantity qi ∈ R+ of a
homogeneous good. Furthermore, we onsider the linear inverse demand funtion:
p(Q) = a− bQ,
where a is the interept of demand, b is the slope of p and Q =
∑
i∈N qi is the total output of
the market. Eah rm produes at onstant average and marginal ost c ∈ R+. Prots for
the ith produer in terms of quantities, πi, is expressed as:
πi(q) = (p(Q)− c)qi.
Without loss of generality, we assume that c = 0.
Following Hart and Kurz (1983) and Chander and Tulkens (1997), we onsider the situation in
whih any subset of rms S form a artel (oalition) while the others ontinue to at independently.
Cartel members are assumed to at as a single rm maximizing their joint prot by orrelating
their strategies. This leads to onsider the set of Cournot oligopoly TU-games in γ-harateristi
funtion form dened as:
vγ(S) =
∑
i∈S
πi(q
∗
i , q˜j),
where (q∗i , q˜j) is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium between S and the other players with the under-
standing that eah player i ∈ S produes idential quantity q∗i and eah outsider j ∈ N\S hooses
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the same quantity q˜j .
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Under these onsiderations, we an ompute the worth of any oalition as
established in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 Let (N, vγ) be an oligopoly TU-game in γ-harateristi funtion form. Then
for any oalition S ∈ 2N\{∅}, it holds that:
vγ(S) =
1
b
(
a
n− s+ 2
)2
.
Proof : Take any S ∈ 2N\{∅}. Cartel members and outsiders' optimal quantities are haraterized
by the rst order onditions:
∀i ∈ S,
∂
∂qi
∑
i∈S
πi(q) = 0⇐⇒ 2b
∑
i∈S
q∗i = a− b
∑
j∈N\S
qj ,
and
∀j ∈ N\S,
∂
∂qj
πj(q) = 0⇐⇒ 2bq˜j = a− b
∑
k∈N\{j}
qk,
respetively. Sine the inverse demand funtion is linear and rms operate at the same marginal
ost, any Cournot-Nash equilibrium implies that idential parties must hoose idential strategies
(quantities), i.e., for any i, k ∈ S, q∗i = q
∗
k and for any j, l ∈ N\S, q˜j = q˜l. From this remark,
the intersetion of the two above reation funtions yields:
q∗i =
a
sb(n− s+ 2)
and q˜j =
a
b(n− s+ 2)
,
whih permits to ompute the worth of oalition S as:
vγ(S) =
∑
i∈S
πi(q
∗
i , q˜j)
=
1
b
(
a
n− s+ 2
)2
.
This onludes the proof. 
Proposition 3.1 shows that any Cournot oligopoly TU-game (N, vγ) is symmetri. The worth
vγ(S) of any oalition S is inreasing with the interept of demand a and the size s of oalition
S. Moreover, it is dereasing with the slope b and the number of outsiders n− s. It follows from
Lardon (2012) that (N, vγ) ∈ Γc.
It is now possible to provide the optimal ne imposed by ompetition authorities in order to
deter the grand oalition.
6
This is a onsequene of the symmetri ost assumption.
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Proposition 3.2 For any Cournot oligopoly TU-game (N, vγ), it holds that:
t(N, vγ) =


1
b
(
a(n − 1)
2(n + 1)
)2
if n ≤ 5;
a2
b
(
5n− 9
36(n − 1)
)
if n > 6.
Proof : Sine the Cournot oligopoly TU-game (N, vγ) is symmetri, the non-emptiness of the
ore is haraterized by the following ondition:
∀S ∈ 2N\{∅},
vγ(S)
s
≤
vγ(N)
n
.
It follows that the optimal penalty t(N, vγ) an be omputed as:
t(N, vγ) = vγ(N)− nmax
S⊂N
vγ(S)
s
=
a2
4b
− n max
s∈{1,...,n−1}
a2
sb(n− s+ 2)2
.
It remains to nd the size s whih minimizes the funtion f(s) = s(n−s+2)2 dened on [1;n−1].
We dedue from f ′(s) = (n− s+ 2)(n − 3s+ 2) and f ′′(s) = −4n+ 6s− 8 that f :
- attains its maximum at point s∗ = (n+ 2)/3 where 1 < s∗ < n− 1 for any n ≥ 3;
- is stritly inreasing on [1; s∗] and stritly dereasing on [s∗;n− 1].
Hene it holds that argmins∈[1,...,n−1] f(s) ⊆ {1;n − 1}. We distinguish two ases:
- rst, if n = 2 it trivially holds that f attains its minimum at s = 1.
- seond assume that n ≥ 3. It follows from f(1) = (n+ 1)2 and f(n− 1) = 9(n − 1) that:
arg min
s∈[1,...,n−1]
f(s) =


{1} if 3 < n < 5;
{1;n − 1} if n = 5;
{n− 1} if n > 5.
Thus, when 2 ≤ n ≤ 5 it holds that:
t(N, vγ) =
a2
4b
− n
a2
b(n+ 1)2
=
1
b
(
a(n− 1)
2(n+ 1)
)2
.
Moreover, when n ≥ 5 it holds that:
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t(N, vγ) =
a2
4b
− n
a2
9b(n− 1)
=
a2
b
(
5n− 9
36(n − 1)
)
,
whih onludes the proof. 
Proposition 3.2 shows that the optimal ne imposed by ompetition authorities is inreasing with
the interept of demand a and the number of rms n. Moreover, it is dereasing with the slope b.
Surprisingly, the expression of the optimal ne leads to distinguish markets of small size (n ≤ 5)
and those of medium and large size (n ≥ 6) for the deterrene of the monopoly power.
We know by Propositions 2.6 and 3.1 that the ontration ore is a singleton. Proposition 3.2
permits to go further by providing an expression of the ontration ore.
Corollary 3.3 For any Cournot oligopoly TU-game (N, vγ), the ontration ore is expressed as:
CC(N, vγ) =


{
1
b
(
a
n+ 1
)2
× e
}
if n ≤ 5;
{(
a2
9b(n − 1)
)
× e
}
if n ≥ 6;
where e = (1, . . . , 1).
In both market types, eah individual payo in the ontration ore is inreasing with the interept
of demand a and dereasing with the slope b and the number of rms n.
4 Axiomatization of the ontration ore
In this setion, we provide an axiomati haraterization of the ontration ore on the set of
balaned TU-games.
Let Γ0 be any arbitrary subset of Γ. A solution on Γ0 is a mapping σ that assigns a (possibly
empty) set σ(N, v) ⊆ XΛ∗(N, v) to any TU-game (N, v).
4.1 Axioms
We now present the axioms relevant to our analysis. The rst two are lassi in the literature on
ore axiomatizations.
Denition 4.1 Non-emptiness (NE) A solution σ on Γ0 satises NE if for any (N, v) ∈ Γ0,
σ(N, v) 6= ∅.
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Denition 4.2 Individual rationality (IR) A solution σ on Γ0 satises IR if for any (N, v) ∈ Γ0,
every x ∈ σ(N, v), and every i ∈ N , xi ≥ v({i}).
Both of these axioms are satised by all ore extensions disussed in the introdution, and so are
useful in haraterizing them.
Next, we introdue three versions of redued games and their orresponding onsisteny axioms
in order to make ore omparisons. Take any (N, v) ∈ Γ, any S ∈ 2N\{∅} and any x ∈ Rn.
The rst redued game type makes a speial treatment to the grand oalition and permits to
haraterize the ore (Peleg, 1986). The DM-redued game (Davis and Mashler, 1965) of
(N, v) with respet to S and x is the game (S, vS,x) ∈ Γ dened for any T ∈ 2
S
as:
vS,x(T ) =


0 if T = ∅;
v(N)− x(N\S) if T = S;
max{v(T ∪Q)− x(Q) : Q ⊆ N\S} otherwise.
Denition 4.3 DM-onsisteny (DM-CON) A solution σ on Γ0 satises DM-CON if for any
(N, v) ∈ Γ, every S ∈ 2N\{∅} and every x ∈ σ(N, v), then (S, vS,x) ∈ Γ0 and x
S ∈ σ(S, vS,x).
The seond version is more general and treats all oalitions in the same way and permits to
haraterize the aspiration ore. The modied DM-redued game (Bejan and Gómez, 2012) of
(N, v) with respet to S and x is the game (S, vS,x∗ ) ∈ Γ dened for any T ∈ 2
S
as:
vS,x∗ (T ) =
{
0 if T = ∅;
max{v(T ∪Q)− x(Q) : Q ⊆ N\S} otherwise.
Denition 4.4 MDM-onsisteny (MDM-CON) A solution σ on Γ0 satises MDM-CON if
for any (N, v) ∈ Γ, every S ∈ 2N\{∅} and every x ∈ σ(N, v), then (S, vS,x∗ ) ∈ Γ0 and x
S ∈
σ(S, vS,x∗ ).
We an verify that the ontration ore does not satises MDM-CON on Γc.
Example 4.5 Consider the TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc suh that N = {1, 2, 3}, v({1}) = v({2}) =
v({3}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = 4, v({1, 3}) = v({2, 3}) = 2, and v({1, 2, 3}) = 10. It holds that
t(N, v) = 6 and CC(N, v) = C(N, vt(N,v)) = {(2, 2, 0)}. When S = {1} and x = (2, 2, 0),
the modied DM-redued game is given by v
{1},x
∗ ({1}) = v({1, 2, 3}) − 2 − 0 = 8. Thus,
2 6∈ CC({1}, v
{1},x
∗ ) = {8} so that the ontration ore does not satised MDM-CON.
The third version whih is relevant for our results makes again a speial treatment to the grand
oalition of any redued game whih is not allowed to ooperate with the omplementary oalition.
This permits to satisfy the feasibility ondition related to seond best time alloation. The new
modied DM-redued game of (N, v) with respet to S and x is the game (S, v∗S,x) ∈ Γ dened
for any T ∈ 2S as:
v∗S,x(T ) =


0 if T = ∅;
max{v(T ∪Q)− x(Q) : Q ⊂ N\S} if T = S;
max{v(T ∪Q)− x(Q) : Q ⊆ N\S} otherwise.
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Denition 4.6 NMDM-onsisteny (NMDM-CON) A solution σ on Γ0 satises NMDM-CON
if for any (N, v) ∈ Γ, every S ∈ 2N\{∅} and every x ∈ σ(N, v), then (S, v∗S,x) ∈ Γ0 and
xS ∈ σ(S, v∗S,x).
Observe that the three axioms of onsisteny dened above satisfy the following logial equality:
DM-CON ∨ NMDM-CON = MDM-CON.
The last axiom diers from the lassi superadditivity axiom on the feasibility requirement.
Denition 4.7 Conditional Superadditivity (C-SUPA) A solution σ on Γ0 satises C-SUPA if
for any (N, vA),(N, vB) ∈ Γ0, every xA ∈ σ(N, vA) and every xB ∈ σ(N, vB), then xA + xB ∈
σ(N, vA + vB) whenever (N, vA + vB) ∈ Γ0 and xA + xB is feasible for (N, vA + vB), i.e.,
xA + xB ∈ XΛ∗(N, vA + vB).
While the feasibility requirement related to rst best time alloation is redundant on the set Γc,
ours is not trivially satised sine the grand oalition is deterred.
4.2 Axiomatization
Before haraterizing the ontration ore, we rst need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.8 Take any B ∈ Λ∗(N) where n ≥ 2 with balaned weights (δH)H∈B. For any
S ∈ 2N\{∅} where s ≥ 2, dene:
BS = {T ⊂ S : T = H ∩ S 6= ∅ for some H ∈ B}
and for every T ∈ BS :
δˆT =
(
1−
∑
H∈B:
H∩S=S
δH
)−1 ∑
H∈B:
T=H∩S
δH .
Then, BS ∈ Λ∗(S) with balaned weight (δˆT )T∈BS .
Proof: First, it follows from
∑
H∈B:i∈H δH = 1, s ≥ 2 and N 6∈ B that
∑
H∈B:H∩S=S δH < 1.
Seond, for eah i ∈ S it holds that:
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(
1−
∑
H∈B:
H∩S=S
δH
) ∑
T∈BS :
i∈T
δˆT =
∑
T∈BS :
i∈T
∑
H∈B:
T=H∩S
δH
=
∑
H∈B:
H∩S⊂S
i∈H
δH
=
∑
H∈B:
H∩S⊆S
i∈H
δH −
∑
H∈B:
H∩S=S
i∈H
δH
=
∑
H∈B:
i∈H
δH −
∑
H∈B:
H∩S=S
δH
= 1−
∑
H∈B:
H∩S=S
δH ,
whih onludes the proof. 
Given any seond best time alloation in a TU-game, Lemma 4.8 provides a formula to ompute
the orresponding seond best time alloation in any of its redued game. It learly implies the
result on NMDM-CON in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.9 The ontration ore satises NE, IR, NMDM-CON and C-SUPA on the set Γc.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that NE, IR and C-SUPA are satised. It remains to prove
that the ontration ore satises NMDM-CON. Let (N, v) ∈ Γc, S ∈ 2
N\{∅} and x ∈ CC(N, v).
We distinguish two ases:
- assume that s ≥ 2. Take B ∈ Λ∗(N) with balaned weights (δH)H∈B suh that x(N) =∑
H∈B δHv(H). Then, by Lemma 4.8 it holds that B
S ∈ Λ∗(S) with balaned weight (δˆT )T∈BS .
Now, we prove that x(T ) ≤ v∗S,x(T ) for eah T ∈ B
S
. Given T ∈ BS, there exists H ∈ B suh
that T = H ∩ S. From x(N) =
∑
H∈B δHv(H) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for eah S ∈ 2
N\{∅, N}, it
holds that x(H) = v(H), hene x(T ) = v(H) − x(H\T ). Sine H\T ⊆ N\S, it holds that
x(T ) ≤ max{v(T ∪Q)− x(Q) : Q ⊆ N\S} = v∗S,x(T ).
Then, we prove that x(T ) ≥ v∗S,x(T ) for eah T ∈ 2
S\{∅, S}. By ontradition, assume that
there exists T ∈ 2S\{∅, S} suh that x(T ) < v∗S,x(T ). Hene there exists y
T ∈ Rt suh that
y(T ) = v∗S,x(T ) and y(T ) > x(T ). Thus, it holds that y(T ) = v(T ∪ Q) − x(Q) for some
Q ⊆ N\S. Hene, y(T ) + x(Q) = v(T ∪Q) and so, x(T ) + x(Q) < v(T ∪Q), a ontradition
with x ∈ CC(N, v) sine T ∪Q ⊂ N . We onlude that x(T ) ≥ v∗S,x(T ) for eah T ∈ 2
S\{∅, S}.
Thus, x(T ) = vS,x(T ) for eah T ∈ B
S
, and so x(S) =
∑
T∈BS δˆTx(T ) =
∑
T∈BS δˆT v
∗
S,x(T ).
Moreover, x(T ) ≥ v∗S,x(T ) for eah T ∈ 2
S\{∅, S} implies that xS ∈ CC(S, v∗S,x).
- assume that s = 1. Take B ∈ Λ∗(N) with balaned weights (δH)H∈B suh that x(N) =∑
H∈B δHv(H). Now, we prove that x
S ≤ v∗S,x(S). Given S = {i}, there exists H ∈ B suh
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that i ∈ H. From x(N) =
∑
H∈B δHv(H) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for eah S ∈ 2
N\{∅, N}, it
holds that x(H) = v(H), hene x(S) = v(H) − x(H\S). Sine H\S ⊂ N\S, it holds that
x(S) ≤ max{v(S ∪Q)− x(Q) : Q ⊂ N\S} = v∗S,x(S).
Then, we prove that xS ≥ v∗S,x(S). By ontradition, assume that x
S < v∗S,x(S). Hene, there is
yS ∈ R suh that yS = v∗S,x(S) and y
S > xS . Thus, it holds that yS = v∗S,x(S) = v(S∪Q)−x(Q)
for some Q ⊂ N\S. Hene, y(S) + x(Q) = v(S ∪ Q) and so, x(S) + x(Q) < v(S ∪ Q), a
ontradition with x ∈ CC(N, v) sine S ∪Q ⊂ N . We onlude that xS ∈ CC(S, v∗S,x). 
Proposition 4.10 Let σ be a solution onept on Γ0 ⊆ Γ satisfying IR and NMDM-CON. If
(N, v) ∈ Γ0 and x ∈ σ(N, v) then x(S) ≥ v(S) for any S ∈ 2
N\{∅, N}.
Proof: Let σ be a solution onept on Γ0 ⊆ Γ satisfying IR and NMDM-CON. Let x ∈ σ(N, v),
S ∈ 2N\{∅, N} and i ∈ S. By NMDM-CON, xi ∈ σ({i}, v
∗
{i},x). By IR, it holds that:
xi ≥ v
∗
{i},x({i})
= max{v({i} ∪Q)− x(Q) : Q ⊂ N\{i}}
≥ v(S)− x(S\{i}),
whih proves that x(S) ≥ v(S) as desired. 
Proposition 4.11 If σ is a solution onept dened on Γ0 ⊆ Γc that satises IR and NMDM-
CON, then for any (N, v) ∈ Γ0, any payo vetor x ∈ σ(N, v) is eient, i.e., x(N) =
maxB∈Λ∗(N)
∑
S∈B δSv(S) (or x ∈ X
∗
Λ∗(N, v)).
Proof: Let σ be a solution onept on Γ0 ⊆ Γc satisfying IR and NMDM-CON. Assume that
(N, v) ∈ Γ0 and take any x ∈ σ(N, v) and any y ∈ XΛ∗(N, v). Then, there is B ∈ Λ
∗(N) suh
that y(N) ≤
∑
S∈B δSv(S). It follows from B ∈ Λ
∗(N) and Proposition 4.10 that:
x(N) =
∑
S∈B
δSx(S)
≥
∑
S∈B
δSv(S)
≥ y(N).
We onlude that x ∈ X∗Λ∗(N, v). 
Proposition 4.12 If σ is a solution onept dened on Γc satisfying IR and NMDM-CON, then
σ(N, v) ⊆ CC(N, v) for any (N, v) ∈ Γc.
Proof: Take any x ∈ σ(N, v). By Proposition 4.10, it holds that x(S) ≥ v(S) for every
S ∈ 2N\{∅, N}. Moreover, by Proposition 4.11, x ∈ X∗Λ∗(N, v). So, x ∈ CC(N, v). 
Proposition 4.13 If a solution onept dened on Γc satises NE, IR, NMDM-CON and C-SUPA,
then CC(N, v) ⊆ σ(N, v) for any (N, v) ∈ Γc.
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Proof:
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Let x ∈ CC(N, v) and dene (N,w) ∈ Γc as:
w(S) =
{
x(S) if |S| ≥ 2;
v(S) if |S| = 1.
It holds that C(N,w) = {x}. By Proposition 4.12, σ(N,w) ⊆ CC(N,w) = C(N,w) = {x}. By
NE, it holds that x ∈ σ(N,w).
Consider the game (N, z) ∈ Γc dened as:
∀S ∈ 2N , z(S) = v(S)− w(S).
Hene, z(S) ≤ 0 if 2 ≤ |S| < n, z({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N and z(N) ∈ R. Note that
0 ∈ CC(N, z) sine 0 = maxB∈Λ∗(N)
∑
S∈B δSz(S) =
∑
i∈N z({i}). By Proposition 4.11, for
every y ∈ CC(N, z) it holds that y(N) = 0. Sine z({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N , we have
yi ≥ 0 by IR and so, y = 0. Thus, CC(N, z) = {0}. By Proposition 3.8, it holds that
σ(N, z) ⊆ CC(N, z) = {0}. By NE, 0 ∈ σ(N, z).
Note that x(N) + 0 = maxB∈Λ∗(N)
∑
S∈B δSv(S) = maxB∈Λ∗(N)
∑
S∈B δS(w + z)(S). So,
x+ 0 ∈ XΛ∗(N,w + z), i.e., x+ 0 is feasible for (N,w + z). Thus, by C-SUPA it follows from
x ∈ σ(N,w) and 0 ∈ σ(N, z) that x+ 0 ∈ σ(N,w + z), hene x ∈ σ(N, v). 
Theorem 4.14 The ontration ore is the only solution onept on Γc that satises NE, IR,
NMDM-CON and C-SUPA.
Proof: Combine Propositions 4.9, 4.12 and 4.13. 
4.3 Independene of the axioms
The following examples show that the axioms used in the haraterization of the ontration ore
are logially independent on the set Γc, i.e., none is implied by the others.
Example 4.15 Consider the solution onept σ1 on Γc suh that for any (N, v) ∈ Γc, σ1(N, v) =
∅. Obviously, σ1 violates NE but vauously satises IR, NMDM-CON and C-SUPA.
Example 4.16 Consider the solution onept σ2 on Γc suh that for any (N, v) ∈ Γc, σ2(N, v) =
XΛ∗(N, v). We know that σ2 satises NE beause XΛ∗(N, v) ⊇ CC(N, v) 6= ∅. It satises C-
SUPA by denition. It follows from Lemma 4.8 and a similar argument used in the proof of
Proposition 4.9 that NMDM-CON is also satised. It should be lear that σ2 violates IR.
Example 4.17 Consider the solution onept σ3 on Γc suh that for any (N, v) ∈ Γc, σ3(N, v) =
{x ∈ XΛ∗(N, v) : xi ≥ v({i})}. Clearly, σ3 satises NE, IR and C-SUPA. The previous result
implies that σ3 does not satisfy NMDM-CON.
7
Our proof is inspired from that in Peleg and Sudhölter (2003) in the ase where n ≥ 3. Nevertheless, the main
dierene is that we don't need to distinguish ases n = 2 and n ≥ 3.
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Example 4.18 For every (N, v) ∈ Γc, every S ∈ 2
N\{∅} and every x ∈ Rn, the exess of
S from x in (N, v) is given by the quantity e(S, x, v) = v(S) − x(S). The exess e(S, x, v)
gives the amount of dissatisfation of oalition S from x in (N, v). We dene the vetor
θ(x) = (θ1(x), . . . , θ2n−1(x)) whose omponents are the numbers (e(S, x, v))S∈2N \{∅} arranged
in non-inreasing order. For any TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc, the ontration nuleolus, denoted by
CN(N, v), is dened as:
CN(N, v) = {x ∈ X∗Λ∗(N, v) : θ(y) ≥L θ(x) for all y ∈ X
∗
Λ∗(N, v)},
where ≥L is the lexiographial ordering. First, sine X
∗
Λ∗(N, v) is non-empty, ompat and
onvex, it follows from orollary 5.1.10 in Peleg and Sudhölter (2003) that CN(N, v) onsists of
a single point. Hene, the ontration nuleolus satises NE. Seond, the ontration nuleolus
also satises IR sine it belongs to the ontration ore. The proof is left as an exerise to
the reader. Finally, the ontration nuleolus omplies with NMDM-CON. The proofs are omitted
beause they are similar to those in Peleg and Sudhölter (2003) in order to show that the nuleolus
satises DM-CON. Hene, it follows from our axiomatization that the ontration nuleolus does
not satisfy C-SUPA.
5 Conluding remarks: extended ontration ore
We have introdued a new solution onept, the ontration ore, that serves as a basis for the
investigation of the deterrene of ooperation. This solution onept has permitted to provide
a measure of the robustness of ooperation whih, as far as we know, has not been analyzed in
the literature. We have suessfully applied the ontration ore to oligopolisti markets and we
have provided optimal ne imposed by ompetition authorities for artel deterrene. We an be
onvined that there are many other potential appliations of the ontration ore.
More generally, we have also provided an axiomati haraterization of the ontration ore in
order to better understand it. In partiular, this has permitted to make omparisons with the ore
and the aspiration ore. We have dened the ontration ore on the set of balaned TU-games
in order to be onsistent with our objetive to study the deterrene of ooperation. We argue that
it is possible to dene an extended ontration ore by applying the feasibility ondition related
to seond best time alloation on the set of all TU-games. The extended ontration ore is
then non-empty on the set of all TU-games and oinides with the aspiration ore on the set of
non-balaned TU-games. In this ase, it will be a straightforward exerie for the reader to hek
that the axiomatization given in Setion 4 still holds on the set of all TU-games.
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